The Global Financial Crisis and the Challenges of the Korean Economy by Kim, In June
The Global Financial Crisis and the 
Challenges of the Korean Economy
 1
In June Kim *
This paper analyzes why the U.S. financial crisis evolved into a 
global financial crisis, and why the Great Moderation led to the Great 
Recession. Then, the U.S. policy responses to the crisis are discussed 
and are compared with the policy measures prescribed by the IMF 
on the Korean economy immediately after the 1997 Korean Currency 
and Banking Crisis. The paper also deals with the sovereign debt 
crises of the Euro zone to analyze the needs for macro-prudential 
regulation and supervision. The main focus of this paper, however, 
is to examine the impacts of the global financial crisis on the Korean 
economy, to evaluate the macro-policy measures meant to ride out 
the crisis, and to present the major challenges that Korea will face 
in the future. Given that internal and external risk factors abound, 
along with persistent uncertainties in the Korean economy, the policies 
on securing price, financial, exchange rate, and fiscal stability as 
well as stable economic growth are recommended.
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I. Introduction
Given the unexpected outbreak and catastrophic impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis on the world economy, the importance of analyzing its 
causes and effects is incontrovertible. Moreover, it is essential to discuss 
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the challenges brought about by the crisis on small open economies such 
as that of South Korea. The discussion of this paper is initiated with a 
brief look on the causes of the Global Financial Crisis, its impacts on 
the real economy, and its rapid spread to the global economy. I also cover 
the U.S. government's policy responses to the crisis and compare these 
with those of Korea. Subsequently, I analyze the impacts of the Global 
Financial Crisis on the Korean economy and Korea's policy responses to 
it. Then I turn to the current issues of Europe’s sovereign debt crises, 
specifically focusing on the question, “Why do European countries still 
suffer from high rates of unemployment and sovereign debt problem?” 
In fact, numerous concerns have been raised as to whether or not the 
sovereign debt problem of the European Union might lead to another 
global banking and financial crisis, thereby causing a double dip in the 
world economy. Finally, after a brief discussion on the need for a macro- 
prudential approach to financial regulations and supervision on the global 
economy, the paper covers major challenges that the Korean economy 
is currently facing in the midst of incremental uncertainty of the world 
economy. 
II. The Causes and Impacts of the U.S. Financial Crisis and 
Policy Response
A. The Causes and Impacts of the U.S. Financial Crisis
One of the most distinctive features of the recent financial crisis is its 
origin and the global economic situation in which it took place. The crisis 
started in the U.S., the world's economic superpower, not in an emerging 
economy, and it happened amidst China's emergence as a new economic 
power, thus yielding significant impact on the restructuring of the global 
economy. The U.S. financial crisis was caused by both government and 
market failure.1 Specifically, the U.S. government took expansionary mon- 
etary policies in order to boost the national economy, which had been 
undergoing recession after the collapse of IT bubbles in the early 2000s. 
The expansionary monetary policies, however, did not take effect on the 
inflation rate over an extended period of time, mainly due to importations 
of cheap manufacturing goods from China and India. Nonetheless, the 
loosened money contributed to the formation of bubbles in real estates 
and housing markets. Moreover, the inflow of foreign capital resulting 
1 See Stiglitz (2010).
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from a global imbalance further raised the money supply in the U.S. 
Both the Clinton and Bush administrations implemented policies that 
provided incentives to personal housing ownership; in turn, these led to 
the proliferation of subprime loans granted to low-credit and low-income 
families.2 However, a hike in the interest rate, which was initially in- 
tended to stabilize the economy, caused a housing bubble burst, resulting 
in households that were unable to pay back their debts. Wall Street 
greed, together with the multi-stage securitization of housing loans as col- 
laterals, and a bank run in the shadow banking system also contributed 
to the financial crisis. Furthermore, the abuse of derivatives increased 
the systemic risk of the shadow banking system. As the price of housing 
fell, insolvencies occurred in complex mortgage-backed securities, and 
bank runs took place in the shadow banking system. The U.S. govern- 
ment's failure in supervising and regulating the financial market, instru- 
ments, and institutions also contributed to the Global Financial Crisis.3
The financial crisis subsequently spread to the real sector, causing a 
great recession. With the spread of the crisis, financial institutions went 
insolvent, and liquidity vanished in the market, undermining financial 
transactions and business activities. Above all, investment activity fell 
dramatically after the crisis.
Moreover, increased unemployment and a drastic drop in housing 
prices hurt consumption, pushing the economy into a recession. Globally, 
international trade contracted faster than the world economy, worsening 
the recession further. To add fuel to the flame, because financial markets 
and institutions were closely interconnected, and a great portion of bad 
loans incurred by the U.S. was held by financial institutions in other 
countries, the country’s financial crisis spread quickly to other regions.
Critically affected by this U.S.-led crisis, the European economy was 
also driven to this economic catastrophe as the inherent problems of fi- 
nancial integration materialized.4 The essential cause of Europe's eco- 
nomic crisis was its hasty introduction of a single currency. The European 
Monetary Union lacked the basic requirements for monetary integration, 
let alone fiscal integration. The Euro zone faced economic difficulties as 
the underlying problems of the currency integration, such as excessive 
sovereign debts and fiscal deficits of Southern European countries, sur- 
faced. Now, it is the world’s concern whether or not European countries 
2 See Krugman (2009).
3 See Hall (2010).
4 See Mishkin (2011).
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can overcome the current challenges of resolving fiscal deficits and sov- 
ereign debt problems, thereby preserving the Euro zone. 
B. Policy Responses of the U.S. Government 
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, the U.S. government took restrict- 
ive monetary policies and raised the federal fund rates by up to 5.25 
percent in the face of a rising inflation. The hike in the rates of the gov- 
ernment policy loan eventually brought about the collapse of housing 
bubbles. The prices of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which issued 
housing as collateral, deteriorated with the collapse of housing bubbles, 
because the housing prices fell short of par value of the MBS. Moreover, 
a fall in the value of MBS engendered bank runs in the shadow banking 
system. Investment banks ― major players in capital markets who usu- 
ally secure funds to invest on MBS through repo markets ― either asked 
more haircuts for a roll-over or withdrew their money from the market 
as the market value of MBS fell. Bank runs in the shadow banking 
system led to a credit crunch, and eventually to a fire-sale of assets.
In fact, the financial crisis spread to the real sector within a short 
period of time. Most importantly, increased uncertainties in the future 
as well as the occurrence of a liquidity crunch led investments to fall. 
Consumers also cut back on their spending in the face of a decrease  
in their wealth. During a worldwide economic crisis (e.g., the Great 
Depression), international trade usually shrinks more rapidly than the 
extent of cutbacks in GDP, and thus, the global economy rapidly enters 
into a great recession. As a result of the intricately interconnected nature 
of the global financial market, the U.S. financial crisis was prone to 
rapidly expand on a global level, hence leading to a worldwide recession. 
In an attempt to offset the fall in investments, consumption, and exports 
as well as to revitalize the economy, the U.S. government implemented 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.
The U.S. government implemented both conventional and unconven- 
tional monetary and credit policies. The Federal Reserve System (Fed), 
which is the central bank of the U.S., introduced a monetary easing 
policy of reducing federal fund rates from 5.25 percent in September 
2007 to 0-0.25 percent in December 2008. The Fed also expanded the 
money supply by granting loans to banks and financial institutions through 
discount windows in order to facilitate the financial market. Discount 
windows were once only limited to banks; however, they became available 
to primary dealers of the capital market. In addition, the Fed also widened 
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the types of securities that can be used as collateral. The Fed accepted 
commercial papers, mortgage bonds, and asset-backed securities as col- 
lateral. The Fed bought vast amounts of MBS to provide immediate li- 
quidity to the construction market, and also lowered mortgage rates to 
stimulate the housing market.
Furthermore, the Fed supplied dollars to the countries that lacked 
dollar liquidity by opening swap lines among their central banks. Given 
that it takes an extended period of time for the drop in short-term inter- 
est rates to have impacts on long-term interest rates, the Fed also took 
quantitative easing policies, directly buying mid- and long-term govern- 
ment bonds. Such policies engendered ambiguity and confusion by blur- 
ring the line between monetary and fiscal policies. In fact, a disagreement 
exists on how effective such quantitative easing policies can actually be 
in stimulating the economy. As a result of a liquidity expansion through 
asset purchases, the monetary base was expanded and the size of assets 
on the Fed's balance sheet increased substantially. With the intention 
of changing the market sentiment on interest rates and inflation, the Fed 
has announced that the current federal fund rates will be maintained 
for an extended period of time after completing two rounds of quantitative 
easing. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. government also took expansionary fiscal policies, 
increasing fiscal expenditures and reducing tax rates. The U.S. fiscal 
deficits for 2009 and 2010 reached almost 9 percent of its GDP. Two 
thirds of the increase in the fiscal deficit accounts for increased fiscal 
expenditures, and the remaining one third, for reduction in tax. More 
often than not, bold fiscal stimulus is needed when consumption, invest- 
ment, and exports are hit by a financial crisis, and when the economy 
is caught in a liquidity trap. Thus, the U.S. government won permission 
from Congress to establish a stimulus package, which amounted to $787 
billion or more than 5 percent of the GDP. The U.S. government spent 
one third of it on tax cuts and two thirds on expanding fiscal spending. 
In fact, when it comes to fiscal spending, the size and scale are signi- 
ficant factors along with the specific composition. In this case, majority 
of the fiscal funds were spent on education, expanding health insurance, 
and developing renewable energy sources.
The U.S. government and the Fed made arrangements to restructure 
some financial institutions: the Fed arranged the M&A between JP Morgan 
Chase and Bear Stearns, and the takeover of Merrill Lynch by the Bank 
of America. The Fed promoted structural reforms by providing liquidities, 
making loans to the merger, and guaranteeing the value of assets of the 
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merged. The U.S. government also received Congress' permission to raise 
bailout funds worth $700 billion through the Troubled Asset Relief Pro- 
gram. The original purpose of the fund was to deal with troubled assets; 
however, as a result of difficulties in calculating asset prices, the fund 
was rather utilized to recapitalize the top-ten ranking banks. As a way 
of coping with bad assets, public-private joint investment funds were 
created by the government.
In order to prevent a moral hazard problem, the U.S. government al- 
lowed Lehman Brothers to collapse on its own. The government, however, 
did not take any drastic measures to reform the financial and industrial 
sectors. Fannie May and Freddie Mac, which are similar to Korea's Korean 
Housing Finance Corporation, are still suffering from an enormous amount 
of insolvent debts, and AIG still remains an ailing insurance giant. 
What is worse, the U.S. central bank still possesses a great share of high 
risk bonds it bought during the financial crisis. The most critical problem 
lies in the fact that the U.S. government continues to take the same 
economic policies that initially caused the Global Financial Crisis. 
The U.S. government's basic stance concerning the crisis is that finan- 
cial restructuring must be led by the private sector, all the while avoiding 
nationalization. Some economists argue that a temporary nationalization 
is inevitable in effectively restructuring the banks that had experienced 
a virtual capital write-off. They believe that they must be privatized upon 
the completion of a restructuring program. Nevertheless, such argument 
is not widely accepted because nationalization is often viewed as a notion 
that goes against capitalism.
C. Problems of the U.S. Economy
As a way of effectively tackling the current crisis and preventing it from 
spreading to other countries, it is imperative that international cooper- 
ation must exist among the U.S., Europe, and East Asia. However, the 
problem is that even the national and regional levels of cooperation have 
not yet taken place, let alone at the international level. The absence of 
a global leadership aggravates the situation. The U.S. and Europe, which 
should take the lead in international coordination, have lost market con- 
fidence. In fact, they have been even criticized for their roles in raising 
risks in the world economy. 
The U.S. Congress also displayed a political brinkmanship when the 
debt ceiling was discussed. Both the U.S. and the European Union are 
suffering from sovereign debt problems and the absence of an effective 
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political leadership. Unemployment rates in the U.S. remain at around 
9 percent; and the debt of the U.S. government came close to its GDP 
level, three years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In early August 
of 2011, one of the world's leading credit rating agencies, Standard & 
Poor's (S&P), downgraded the country’s top-notch AAA rating to AA+. 
The downgrade triggered a fluctuation in the global stock markets and 
also raised uncertainties within the international financial market. The 
U.S. Congress was only able to reach an agreement on raising the debt 
ceiling only at the last minute. The political brinkmanship raises a ques- 
tion on whether the U.S. has the capability to deal with its own economic 
problems, let alone lead the global economy. S&P cited the prolonged 
high rate of unemployment and large-scale government debt, as well as 
the lack of political leadership as the major reasons for downgrading 
the rating.
Fiscal deficit reduction requires cuts in fiscal spending and increases 
in new revenues. However, the bill, which was meant to raise the federal 
debt ceiling, did not include specific ways of raising new revenues. 
Congress agreed to cut the fiscal deficit only through the control of gov- 
ernment fiscal spending. Effectiveness of the fiscal policy is doubted when 
there is no room for a tax increase. In addition, without agreements on 
pension and health care reforms, there is a limit to reducing the fiscal 
expenditure. 
The global financial market is directly affected by sentiments about 
U.S. leadership and the prospects of sovereign debt problems of the Euro 
zone. Given that the American consumer confidence index has reached 
its all-time low in 30 years, the global stock market fluctuated and stock 
prices plummeted. Three years have already passed since the Global 
Financial Crisis was triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. None- 
theless, the stock market has yet to recover to its pre-crisis level. The 
Federal Reserve Board has announced that it will keep federal fund rates 
at zero for the next two years in order to boost the economy. The quan- 
titative easing policies, previously implemented twice, would not be re- 
newed, but the Fed will continue the zero interest rates policy in order 
to boost investment and consumption. 
The zero interest policy will undoubtedly increase the supply of the 
dollar; however, the expansionary monetary policy of the U.S. will under- 
mine the dollar's value and its status as a vehicle currency. It can also 
raise the volatility of foreign exchange rates in emerging markets. Thus, 
it may be a key factor that can trigger further uncertainties in the global 
economy. 
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The U.S. is dramatically losing its ground in the global economy, and 
its growth continues to slow down in recent years. In these circum- 
stances, the challenged dollar's status could cause turmoil in the global 
financial order, and in the end, the world's leading currencies (including 
the U.S. dollar, the Euro, and the Yuan) are expected to play a major 
role as global reserve assets. However, there will be no single global re- 
serve asset to replace the U.S. dollar at this point: the Euro zone crisis 
undermines the status of the Euro, and China strictly controls the inflow 
and outflow of capital. Nonetheless, as the dollar's value continues to 
fall, many countries would begin to raise a question on the dollar's role 
as the foreign exchange reserves. To address this issue, Dr. Eichengreen 
has suggested issuing a global-GDP-linked bond as a global reserve asset.5
III. Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on the Korean 
Economy and Its Policy Response
A. Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on the Korean Economy
The Global Financial Crisis has had a major impact on the Korean 
economy as well.6 Foreign investors thought that the Korean economy 
might be very vulnerable to the Global Financial Crisis, citing three main 
reasons. First, they mentioned the high loan-to-deposit ratios, which once 
reached a staggering 125 percent. Such high ratios imply that some por- 
tions of loans had to be financed through capital markets and abroad. 
They also thought that if the problems similar to those that occurred in 
the U.S. were to arise in the capital market, Korean banks might find 
themselves having trouble financing necessary funds. In fact, in Korea, 
a certificate of deposit ― a major tool in financing from the capital market 
― is often considered similar to short-term deposits. 
Second, they mentioned the large amount of foreign debts and the high 
ratio of short-term debt to GDP as the weaknesses of the Korean econ- 
omy. Interest differentials and continuing appreciation of the Korean won 
prior to the global crisis, in fact, were contributing factors in the accu- 
mulation of foreign debt. However, towards the end of 2007, Korea was 
a net creditor country, and had foreign reserves amounting to US$ 
262.2 billion. Foreign investments in Korea, however, exceeded Korea's 
overseas investment by US$ 183.3 billion as of 2007, as foreigners made 
5 See Eichengreen (2011).
6 See Kim and Rhee (2009).
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large investments in Korea's capital market. Such foreign investments 
are not considered foreign debts, but rather as funds that are always 
prepared to flow out in the event of a global financial turmoil. 
Finally, foreign investors also cited the deterioration of the current 
account balance in the second half of 2008 as a fundamental weakness 
of the Korean economy. Given that the Korean capital market was widely 
open, and there was no restriction on the flow of foreign capital, a large 
amount of foreign capital left the Korean capital market in the midst of 
the global credit crunch. Outflow of foreign capital had direct impacts 
on the foreign exchange market. Exchange rates exceeded 1500 twice, 
pushing Korea almost on the verge of a currency crisis. Exchange rates, 
however, were stabilized with the currency swap arrangements made 
with the U.S. Furthermore, a great deal of depreciation in the Korean 
won contributed to the early recovery of Korean exports assisting in the 
revitalization of the Korean economy. 
Due to the Global Financial Crisis, the growth rate of the Korean econ- 
omy also suffered, falling from 2.3 percent in 2008 to 0.2 percent in 
2009. In the face of a recession, the Korean government took expan- 
sionary monetary and fiscal policies; furthermore, the Bank of Korea 
(BOK) reduced call rates from 5.25 percent to 2 percent in the short run. 
In addition, the Korean government also increased fiscal expenditures 
and cut tax rates. In 2008, Korea’s fiscal deficits reached 5.8 percent of 
the GDP. The increase in fiscal expenditures accounts for two thirds of 
the increased deficits, and the tax cuts for the remaining one third. As 
a result of the aggressive fiscal and monetary policies, along with the 
dropping value of the Korean won, the Korean economy began to recover 
rapidly, and the growth rate of the economy reached 6 percent in 2010. 
B. Korea's Policy Response
After the fall of Lehman Brothers, Korean monetary authorities, based 
on a lesson learned from the 1997 crisis, cut policy rates drastically and 
injected massive liquidity into the financial market. The interest rates 
were lowered over a five-month period from 5.25 percent in October 2008 
to about 2 percent in February 2009. Although Korea pulled itself out 
of the crisis and posted a 6 percent growth rate by 2010, the interest 
rate stood at 3.25 percent as of October 2011, with the real interest rate 
maintaining a negative value for several months. 
Furthermore, the aggressive implementation of expansionary monetary 
policies prevented the credit crunch and stabilized the domestic financial 
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markets. With an improved cash flow in both the won and the dollar, 
the real economy began to stabilize. Comparing the level of monetary 
easing policies of Korea with those of major advanced countries (e.g., 
U.S., Euro zone, the U.K., Japan, and Taiwan) using real interest rates 
adjusted to the inflationary expectation, Korea ranks the lowest in the 
short-term real interest rates, and the second lowest after the U.K. in 
the long-term real interest rates. This ranking means that Korea im- 
plemented more extensive monetary easing policies than the U.S. or the 
Euro zone. Additionally, this implies that an exit strategy, which should 
normalize interest rates faster, would have been a more appropriate 
option for Korea. 
Even though the BOK raised call rates in the face of inflationary con- 
cerns, it had kept the real interest rates below zero for an extended period 
of time. In doing so, it missed the proper exit timing of its monetary 
policies. Prolonged low interest rate policies contributed to raising the 
inflationary expectations and increasing household debts, thereby under- 
mining the financial stability. However, financial policies also made sig- 
nificant contributions in easing instability in the financial market. Banning 
the short sale of stocks and establishing a joint stock market stabilization 
fund also helped alleviate wild fluctuation and volatility in the stock 
market, which were initially caused by the sudden outflow of foreign cap- 
ital. The creation of bond market stabilization funds and tax benefits 
for corporate bonds also facilitated the improvements in the SMEs' cash 
flow amid the credit crunch. The gap between government and corporate 
bonds widened disproportionately in the beginning, but narrowed down 
later on; in turn, this contributed to the stability of the bond market 
and corporate financing.
In the foreign exchange sector, various policy measures were taken, 
such as signing currency swap agreements with the U.S., China, and 
Japan; strengthening prudential regulation and supervision on foreign 
reserves; and introducing devices to ease volatility in capital flows. Bearing 
in mind the lesson learned from the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean 
government set up contingency plans and reacted in an orderly manner 
to prevent the outbreak of another currency crisis. A currency swap with 
the U.S. also contributed to easing the foreign exchange instability gen- 
erated by the capital outflow. Nonetheless, the government's intervention 
in foreign exchange markets was proven to be marginally effective. Its 
high exchange rate policies in the beginning of 2008 caused market in- 
stability and drove market sentiments to cause a further depreciation of 
the won. Ironically, however, the drastic increase in the exchange rates 
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boosted Korea's exports, consequently helping the economy to take a 
rather rapid recovery from the recession.
Faced with the recent global crisis, Korea has also employed expan- 
sionary fiscal policies. The ratios of Korea's fiscal expansion to GDP were 
1.1 percent in 2008, 3.7 percent in 2009, and 1.2 percent in 2010, hov- 
ering over the average of the G20 countries. Korea's fiscal policy was more 
focused on expanding fiscal spending than on providing tax benefits. As 
it is generally known, spending is more effective than tax benefits in the 
short term. Thus, it was a valid approach for Korea to opt for a spending 
expansion during the crisis.
Despite the effects mentioned above, Korea's fiscal policy responses 
were timely. The package of measures against high oil prices, which fo- 
cused on giving tax benefits and helping working families, had proven 
helpful in preventing a dramatic downturn. Revised and supplementary 
budgets were drawn up, and the front-loading of fiscal spending was 
encouraged to maximize the effects of fiscal expansion. The government's 
fiscal expansion can be summed up as an investment expansion to build 
future growth engines, including investing in social overhead capital 
(SOC) and green growth, as well as to increase transfer payments for the 
low-income class, SMEs, and the self-employed. Apart from fiscal spend- 
ing, investments in public enterprises were boosted together with the gov- 
ernment's investment expansion.
Most fiscal expansion policies were temporary, and tax benefits also 
took the form of temporary tax exemptions. Income and corporate tax 
cuts (provided to stimulate the economy) as well as fuel tax returns and 
subsidies (introduced to cope with high oil prices) played significant roles 
in keeping the domestic demand from falling. Tax cuts provided to the 
auto industry also proved to be effective in sustaining the domestic de- 
mand. Meanwhile, although the government attempted to lower the top 
income and corporate tax rates, cuts were postponed to secure the budget 
to meet the increased welfare demand and to achieve fiscal balance by 
2013.
Overall, the aggressive fiscal policy was very effective for economic re- 
covery after the crisis. However, it turned out to have worsened the coun- 
try's fiscal health in the long run: Korea's national debt increased to 
100 trillion won over the three years from 299.2 trillion won in 2007 to 
392.8 trillion won in 2010. Its debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 30.7 percent 
in 2007 to 33.5 percent in 2010. In fact, the average debt-to-GDP ratio 
of the G20 countries in 2011 is expected to be 77.3 percent. This repre- 
sents a 16.7 percent increase from the end of 2007, thus indicating 
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that Korea is faring relatively well. Still, the implementation of strong 
measures in order to control government debt is needed, considering the 
following facts: Korea has a great amount of debt that is not officially 
calculated as national debt, but, in effect, can be counted as one. The 
growing proportion of the aging population of Korea can possibly lead to 
a greater medical welfare demand and less growth potential.
Meanwhile, the Korean government raised funds for financial and in- 
dustrial restructuring, such as bank recapitalization funds, financial sta- 
bility funds, and corporate restructuring funds. However, it did not carry 
out bold reforms because of the possibility that implementing major struc- 
tural reforms during a continued recession could undermine economic 
recovery. This means that despite the increased insolvency of savings 
banks, no preemptive action policies were taken to restructure the sector. 
This inaction is due to the concern that doing so might cause further 
harm to the already unstable financial market, along with the anticipation 
that the banks can survive with the help of an early economic recovery. 
As a result of the failure in restructuring the savings banks at the right 
time, their insolvency aggravated and caused some of them to shut down 
in late 2011. 
A corporate structural reform is required to prevent the financial crisis 
from spreading to the real economy and the damage from spilling back 
over to the financial sector. The faltering shipbuilding and construction 
industries, in particular, were in desperate need of structural reforms. 
However, restructuring took place only in a passive manner because cred- 
itor banks, who were already burdened with putting aside provisions for 
bad debts, were hesitant to blacklist such industries. Given that the re- 
covery of the economy was its utmost priority, the Korean government 
did not do much to restructure the financial and industrial sectors. 
Trade-offs between an early recovery of economy and achievements in 
structural reforms exist. Consequently, timely reforms in savings banks, 
construction, and in mid-sized shop-building sectors were neglected. 
C. Differences in Policy Prescription between the U.S. and Korea
The macroeconomic policies implemented by the U.S. government are 
quite opposite to the policies prescribed by the IMF for Korea in reaction 
to the 1997 Korean Currency and Banking Crisis. Contrary to the ex- 
pansionary monetary and fiscal policies, the IMF forced Korea to take 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. Immediately after the 1997 crisis, 
the IMF asked the BOK to raise its interest rates twofold.7
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Granted, Korea's crisis was different because it was suffering from 
banking and currency crises at that time, its high interest rate policy, 
however, was not effective in stopping the capital outflow. The IMF also 
forced Korea to drastically reform the nation’s financial and industrial 
sectors from the bottom of the economic cycle. 
Moreover, the IMF advised Korea to temporally nationalize the troubled 
financial institutions whenever necessary, whereas the U.S. sought to 
avoid nationalization as much as possible. Of course, the U.S. is in a 
different position because, unlike Korea, its currency is used as a vehicle 
currency. Yet, even with that in mind, the fact that the U.S. took the 
exact opposite approach from Korea is worth noting. Nevertheless, the 
reason Korea could overcome the current global crisis rather quickly 
was partly due to the structural reform that it implemented during the 
1997 economic crisis. The Korean government spent a great amount of 
public funds on restructuring the financial and industrial sector. 
Although U.S. policies have kept its economy from a complete break- 
down, it is now facing another perplexing issue: How is it going to handle 
the side effects and negative consequences stemming from the policies? 
In the coming days, the Fed will have to normalize assets and liabilities 
that have surged so far because of the liquidity supplies and bond pur- 
chases. Meanwhile, there is another critical issue looming over the coun- 
try: How will the U.S. achieve fiscal balance and manage government 
debts that now amount to the level of its GDP.
IV. Sovereign Debt Crises of Europe and Policy Options 
A. Problems of the Euro Zone
The economic crisis of 2011 three years after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers differs from the one in 2008 triggered by the U.S. subprime 
mortgage loans. This time, the major advanced countries are faced with 
sovereign debt problems as their fiscal deficits accumulated through the 
global financial turmoil; specifically, the crisis of 2011 can be defined as 
a sovereign debts crisis. Thus far, preventing the contagion effects and 
the sovereign debts crisis developing into a banking crisis have been the 
major focus of concern. 
The problems faced by the Euro zone are more severe than those of 
the U.S. The economic problems of the Euro zone result from the follow- 
7 See Kim and Rhee (1998).
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ing unstable elements that are inherent in the modern financial system: 
low capital to debt ratio of the banking sector, risk premium, and doubts 
on the safety of sovereign debt. In the past, sovereign debts were regarded 
as safe assets because they were mostly owned by the people of the issuing 
country. However, in the case of the Euro zone problem, given that a 
large portion of sovereign debts are owned by European banks, defaults 
on sovereign debts will surely impair the soundness of European banks. 
Furthermore, risk premium rises at an increasing rate with the worsening 
debts situation. With increasing risk premium, accumulation of debts will 
further hurt the ability of those countries to pay back their own debts. Due 
to the fact that banks maintain only a fraction of assets as capital, and 
major European banks own a large portion of the southern European coun- 
tries’ debts, defaults on the debts will have direct impacts on the solvency 
of some major European banks, thus leading to the European banking 
and financial system into turmoil.
For example, Greece is almost on the verge of declaring an economic 
moratorium, but the Euro zone members have yet to come up with any 
feasible solutions either to rescue the troubled members or to prevent 
the contagion of the crisis to other member countries, such as Italy and 
Spain. The repayment capability of Greece depends on whether or not it 
can contain its debt-to-GDP ratio to a certain manageable level in the 
long run. To that end, real interest rates need to be lower than the real 
growth rates. However, risk premium increased interest rates in some 
southern European countries, and these countries have also limits on 
boosting real growth rates. Meanwhile, the European banks' solvency is 
also poised on a risky situation, because they hold a large amount of sov- 
ereign bonds of southern European countries. Recently, major French 
banks' stock prices plummeted, reflecting such anxiety in the market. 
The French and German governments, which are relatively free from the 
European crisis, should take measures to improve the soundness of their 
banks through providing a public fund, if necessary. 
It is crucial that the debt crisis in Greece be addressed boldly so that 
the crisis does not spread throughout Spain and Italy, Europe's fourth 
and third largest economy, respectively. The debt-to-GDP ratio of Greece 
has already reached 150 percent, and the risk premium on the Greece 
sovereign debts skyrocketed to an unmanageable level. The national debt 
of Greece should be restructured to reduce real burdens. Greece may 
learn from the debt restructuring experiences of Latin American countries 
in the 1980s. Moreover, the challenges in Spain and Italy are serious 
because interest rates of the bonds issued by these governments have 
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increased above 7 percent recently, far exceeding the nominal growth 
rates. If a debt crisis takes place in Spain and Italy, the Euro zone will 
hardly exist — the entire Euro zone will be swept off by the financial crisis 
because the European banks that hold these bonds would become insolv- 
ent.
B. Euro Zone Policy Options
The Euro zone should first decide on whether or not to dissolve the 
union. The criteria for such decision must include a cost comparison of 
dissolving and rescuing the troubled country. If the Euro zone decides 
that preserving the monetary union is the better option, all the possible 
and necessary short- and long-term measures to achieve this goal re- 
quires implementation. At this point, the union has three policy options. 
The first is to continue in its present condition. In fact, it is more likely 
to retain current policies by providing sufficient liquidities to rollover the 
current sovereign debts and demanding debtor countries. Austere pro- 
grams to reduce fiscal deficits and sovereign debts could continue. How- 
ever, such policies do not facilitate an early economic recovery for debtor 
countries, nor effectively prevent the contagion of sovereign debt crisis 
to other European countries. This option may also aggravate the present 
uncertain situation. The Euro zone may not recover from the economic 
hardships over an extended period of time, similar to Japan for the past 
20 years.
The second option is to execute more resolute actions to prevent the 
expected twin crises of sovereign debt and banking. Policies are necessary 
to restructure sovereign debts and recapitalize European banks that may 
suffer from capital losses due to increasing insolvencies of sovereign 
debts. The main objectives of such policies are to prevent the sovereign 
debt crisis from spreading to sound countries and prevent its further 
development into the banking and financial crisis. Larger haircuts on 
sovereign debts and the recapitalization of major European banks are 
required. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) should assume higher responsibilities in restruc- 
turing the financial sectors; it must, therefore, provide liquidities, grant 
loans, guarantee debts, and recapitalize insolvent banks. Though creditor 
countries can incur sacrifices, the second option is a feasible and mean- 
ingful short- and medium-term solution. 
The third option is to move towards a fiscal union. As a first step, the 
European Union may issue Euro bonds to substitute for the sovereign 
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debts of troubled countries. If Euro bonds are introduced, single interest 
rates may then be applied to all participating countries. Thus, although 
this can benefit heavily indebted countries, but financially sound ones 
can incur higher costs. In other words, financially sound countries would 
heavily subsidize the indebted countries and share in the interest pay- 
ments. 
The problem with issuing Euro bonds lies in identifying which organ- 
ization assumes the responsibility and in how much bonds are issued. 
An organization that determines the size of issuance and interest rates 
is required, similar to how the ECB is responsible for monetary and ex- 
change rate policies in the Euro zone. For instance, as of August 19, 
2011, the 10-year government bond yield for Greece and Portugal, which 
were under a financial crisis, increased to 15.7% and 10.1%, respectively. 
The ECB purchased Italian and Spanish bonds to stabilize the European 
sovereign debt market, and the yield on the 10-year bonds declined to 
4.9% and 4.92%, respectively. In comparison, the yield on Germany 
bonds was approximately 2.1%. 
Debt-burdened countries resolving their fiscal deficit problem by using 
Euro bonds still have further problems if they fail to restore their fiscal 
soundness. Of course, the European Monetary Union already set the rules 
on the general government budget deficits and the gross debt to be within 
3% and 60% of the GDP, respectively. As such, fiscal soundness could 
be demanded. However, questions remain on how to manage countries 
(e.g., Greece and Portugal) that fail to honor these criteria and drive 
their economies to the wall as well as on the necessary actions if these 
countries complacently believe that Euro bonds would solve all their econ- 
omic problems. As such, it is inevitable to impose a certain condition 
on participating countries (i.e., demanding fiscal soundness). The fact that 
Germany and France have a significant vote in the decision-making 
process similarly merits consideration. Thus, an organization with the 
capability to monitor and regulate the fiscal soundness of participating 
countries is necessary. This organization should have the authority to 
impose proper measures on countries that fail to honor the criteria. 
Meanwhile, such an organization, tentatively named the European Fiscal 
Commission, can assist in more effective issuance of Euro bonds. The 
commission can serve as the counterpart of the ECB or the IMF in the 
Euro zone. In the end, the introduction of Euro bonds means that all 
the member countries would borrow credit from Germany or France; this 
would mean, however that these two fiscally sound countries would bear 
the heaviest burdens. However, decisions that are favorable to Germany 
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are not guaranteed to be the same for all the Euro zone states. Germany 
sees a balance of payment surplus in the Euro zone, but not all countries 
can become a surplus nation. If this is the case, the Euro zone fiscal 
policies and framework should focus on gradually reducing deficits of the 
debt-ridden countries over the long-term while preventing the reoccur- 
rence of recession. Issuance of Euro bonds to cover fiscal deficits also 
implies the monetization of sovereign debts, and is deeply intertwined 
with government fiscal policy. Therefore, issuing Euro bonds can be re- 
garded as a first step towards a fiscal union. Both monetary and fiscal 
consolidations are often considered as necessary conditions for the opti- 
mum currency area such as the Euro zone. In this sense, the third option 
is the ultimate solution for the Euro zone if it intends to remain as a 
single-currency area. 
V. The Growing Importance of Financial Regulation and 
Supervision
A. Importance of Macro Prudential Regulation8
The importance of macro-prudential supervision intensifies during a 
global crisis. Such supervision is a general equilibrium approach to sta- 
bilizing the entire financial system, which takes on even greater signifi- 
cance in times like these, that is, when the Global Financial Crisis ori- 
ginated not from banks but from the shadow banking system (e.g., hedge 
funds, investment banks, and insurance companies). The previous method, 
which can be characterized by financial supervision and regulation en- 
forced by individual financial institutions, did not guarantee stability of 
the overall financial system. In other words, policies taken by an individ- 
ual institution to improve its own financial prudence do not guarantee 
the soundness of the entire financial system; in some cases, it may even 
cause more harm.9 
Here, two examples are provided to prove that micro prudential regu- 
lation leads to credit crunch and fire sales of assets. The first one is 
described as follows. Suppose that there are three financial institutions, 
A, B, and C. Let us assume that B owes money to A, C to B, C to A. 
Suppose that A intends to raise its BIS ratio and asks B to pay off its 
debt, then B asks C, and then C asks A to pay back to achieve its target 
8 See Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011).
9 See Shleifer and Vishny (2011).
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BIS ratio as well. This process will only drain liquidity and lead to a 
credit crunch, making the entire financial system unstable. Yet institution 
A fails to achieve its original purpose of increasing its BIS ratio. One 
financial institution selling its assets would not have much impact on 
asset prices. However, if all financial institutions dispose of their assets 
at the same time to improve their respective BIS ratios, a credit crunch 
(i.e., a drastic fall in market credit) and fire-sales (i.e., assets sold at 
extremely discounted prices) might simultaneously occur. If asset prices 
significantly fall, institutions would fail to raise their BIS ratios and may 
need to sell more assets.
Let us consider the second example. Suppose that bank A has US$ 
100 billion in assets, US$ 90 billion in liabilities, and US$ 10 billion in 
equities, obtaining a current BIS ratio of 10%. Assume that the bank’s 
target BIS ratio is 12.5%. If the bank sells its assets at current prices, 
the BIS ratio could increase to 12.5%, with the assets and liabilities re- 
duced by $20 billion. Nevertheless, if an excessive number of banks can 
only sell their assets at 10% discounted price, then the balance sheet 
would reflect a decrease of $20 billion in assets and $18 billion in li- 
abilities, incurring a capital loss of $2 billion. Thus, assets would de- 
crease from $100 to $80 billion and equity from $10 to $8 billion, re- 
taining the BIS ratio at 10%. This would mean that additional disposal 
of assets is necessary to raise the ratio — the outcome caused by fire- 
sales.
As a means to enhance macro-prudential regulation and supervision, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) have been working towards strengthening regula- 
tions on bank capital and liquidity, and reinforcing risk management of 
Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI). Here, the key issue 
lies in securing enough equity to prevent financial systemic risks. Time- 
varying BIS ratio is likewise necessary to control capital pro-cyclicality. 
This means that capital buffer must be increased during an economic 
boom to cover the loss during a slump. Capital buffer has two types, 
namely, capital conservation and counter cyclical capital. Measures to 
improve the quality of capital are also necessary. Thus far, the BIS ratio 
has been measured as the ratio of the Tier 1 capital to risk weighted 
assets. Tier 1 capital includes preferred stocks, the interest payments of 
which may significantly strain banks during a financial crisis. 
In September 2010, BIS member countries agreed to strengthen the 
regulation on capital adequacy. Specifically, the current 2% of common 
stock equity ratio, consisting of common stocks and earned surplus, is 
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expected to reach 4.5% by 2015 and 7% by 2019. In cases of an extreme 
credit boom, supervision authorities may request banks to accumulate 
an additional 2.5% capital to control for pro-cyclicality. In the modified 
rule, banks are required to maintain either 7% common stock equities 
during normal times and 9.5% during credit booms, or 8.5% Tier 1 capital 
during normal times and 11% during credit booms. 
Banks could increase their BIS ratios either through the accumulation 
of additional capital or disposal of some assets. When prompt corrective 
actions improve the BIS ratio, raising capital is encouraged more than 
reducing assets, to prevent the credit crunch and fire sales. However, 
raising capital through the market can be difficult in times of crisis. 
When a firm or financial institution becomes insolvent, shareholders first 
bear the loss, and then the creditors follow. In such cases, bailout funds 
can be created to help banks recapitalize, using measures that prevent 
the moral hazard of banks. Issuing reverse or contingent convertibles 
could be another way to increase the BIS ratio. Reverse convertible bond 
can be converted into stocks when the BIS ratio falls under a certain level. 
Similarly, insuring assets can also improve the BIS ratio. Nevertheless, 
the risks of ineffective insurance existed when the Global Financial Crisis 
occurred, and the saved funds cannot fully cover the insurance money.
Similar to the BIS ratio in the shadow banking system, the down pay- 
ment (haircut) ratio functions as a safety net in financial transactions. 
Acting as the bank BIS ratio, an appropriate level of down payment may 
be required for stable financial transactions. In addition, minimum le- 
verage regulation (3% in Tier 1 terms) would be introduced to control 
the ratio of equity to total assets.
Moreover, liquidity must be secured in the market to guard against 
credit crunch and fire-sales. The maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities requires the security of sufficient short- and long-term liquidity 
to maintain stability in the financial system. In particular, Korea has 
problems securing liquidities in both its own and foreign currencies. 
For the global financial regulatory reform, enhancing liquidity standards 
that cover both short-term liquidity ratio (liquidity coverage ratio) and 
mid- to long-term liquidity ratio (net stable funding ratio) are actively 
being discussed. The liquidity coverage ratio refers to the stock of high 
quality liquid assets divided by net cash outflows over 30 days. Short- 
term liquidity regulation requires this ratio to be maintained at over 
100%, which means that a sufficient amount of high quality liquid assets 
are secured for a month. Regulation on this ratio requires that the ratio 
of the available to the required amount of stable funding be maintained 
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at over a 100%, to ensure the necessary liquidity for a year.
Meanwhile, international institutions agreed that to resolve problems 
of foreign currency liquidity and highly erratic foreign exchange rates, 
individual countries must regulate the dynamic fluctuations of short-term 
foreign capital flows, which were notably witnessed during the Global 
Financial Crisis. Regulation and supervision on SIFI are considered neces- 
sary at the global level due to problems of moral hazards. If the inter- 
national institutions excessively resort to notions of being “too large to 
fail” or “too well-connected to fail,” poor risk management and systemic 
financial risk could most likely occur. In fact, the recent crisis has proven 
that major financial institutions were mainly responsible for the global 
financial systemic risk. 
Currently, there are active debates regarding the process of setting up 
global standards to define SIFIs and measures to strengthen proper super- 
vision and regulation. There are several criteria used in identifying SIFIs, 
including size, substitutability, and interconnectedness; however, diffi- 
culties in reaching an agreement in the actual selection processes is 
also expected. Moreover, the question remains as to whether or not the 
selection at the international level is enough or additional national level 
processes must be introduced. The current discussion on SIFI regulation 
and supervision mainly focuses on finding supplementary regulations 
on capital and liquidity as well as on containing the contagion effects to 
prevent the systemic risk. 
B. Regulation on Blind Spots
Various measures on regulation blind spots are also discussed, some 
of which have already been agreed upon, such as strengthening super- 
vision on hedge funds, over-the-counter derivatives market, as well as 
credit rating agencies improving the incentive systems for financial insti- 
tutions and reforming accounting systems. Investment losses of private 
equity firms and hedge funds have a far-reaching impact across the econ- 
omy, engendering credit crunch and system risks in the financial market. 
These are regulatory systems that could identify problems of non-banking 
systems, and as such, the evaluation of these risks is necessary. 
OTC derivatives markets are intricately connected with multiple trade 
partners; thus, risks could quickly spread to other financial markets. 
Thus, new infrastructures (e.g., central counter party, trade repository, 
and electronic commerce platform) are necessary to prevent excessive 
risk-building and induce a more open and transparent market. Reforms 
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on the incentive systems are similarly indispensable. Based on short-term 
performance, the old incentive system motivated the management to take 
excessive risks. A number of reform measures are discussed at the FSB, 
such as establishing effective governance system, setting up risk-adjusted 
compensation scheme, promoting public disclosure, and enhancing gov- 
ernment supervision on incentive systems.
Reform is similarly necessary on accounting systems that enable the 
consistent applications of a global accounting standard. This is especially 
critical when financial information loses credibility due to difficulties in 
the value assessment of financial products, complexity of accounting stand- 
ards, and increasing off-balance-sheet transactions. Balancing mark-to- 
market and book value as well as accumulating loss provisions against 
expected future losses are a few examples of the many accounting re- 
forms that can be implemented. 
Furthermore, given the heavy investor reliance on their inaccurate risk- 
assessment and credit-rating, the fundamentals of a credit rating agency 
require upgrades by maintaining independence, preventing conflicts of 
interests, improving the quality of credit rating, and increasing public 
disclosure of information. Above all, the problem of moral hazard and 
conflict of interest (agencies receiving service charges from the financial 
institutions whose credit and financial instruments are being rated) re- 
quire meticulous management.
C. The Need to Ensure Global Coordination of Financial 
Regulation and Supervision
The global coordination of financial regulation and supervision is es- 
sential in preventing regulation arbitrage on a global basis. In January 
2010, the Obama administration proposed financial reforms to separate 
investment from commercial banks; the latter were then banned from 
holding hedge and private equity funds. If such reforms continued, major 
changes are expected to occur in the U.S. financial structure, directly 
and indirectly influencing the reform plans of Korea's financial sector.
Setting up standards has been discussed to regulate and supervise 
the financial sector as well as to prevent another financial crisis from 
recurring. Such discussions aim for the following: strengthening regula- 
tion over the financial institutions regarding capital adequacy and liqui- 
dity, setting an upper limit to leverage; strengthening supervision and 
regulation on housing mortgage loans, choosing and strengthening re- 
gulations on systemically important financial institutions, improving the 
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governance and compensation structure of financial institutions, improv- 
ing risk management on derivatives, and enhancing the objectiveness 
and transparency of credit rating agencies.
VI. The Challenges Faced by the Korean Economy10
A. The Need for Macro-Risk Management
Three years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, internal and ex- 
ternal risk factors abound along with the uncertainties that remain in 
the Korean economy. In early August of 2011, Standard & Poor's, one 
of the world's leading credit rating agencies, downgraded the credit rating 
of the U.S., which led to extreme fluctuations in the Korean stock market. 
Prices drastically dropped and volatility greatly intensified, causing im- 
mense turmoil in the financial market. Several reasons cause Korea’s 
stock market to fluctuate more than those of key player countries such 
as the U.S. or Euro zone. As a small open economy, Korea is highly 
sensitive to overseas economic downturn. The export-oriented Korean 
economic model has been viewed as more vulnerable especially after the 
Global Financial Crisis. In August 2011, trade surplus significantly de- 
creased and stock prices heavily fluctuated in automobile, petro-chemical, 
and shipbuilding industries, which effectively served the Korean economy 
in the past. In addition, the Korean industrial competitiveness has, in 
effect, been re-evaluated. Well-known, hardware-oriented Korean elec- 
tronics and semiconductor industries rapidly grew, achieving top ranks 
in their respective fields. Nevertheless the advent of smart phones has 
changed the landscape of the IT industry with higher emphasis on sof- 
tware competitiveness. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the 
Korean economy would be able to develop globally competitive software 
industry in a short period of time and achieve top ranks.
In addition, the Euro zone crisis negatively affected the global financial 
market, and massive European capital was removed from the Korean 
market, causing considerable depreciation and extreme fluctuations of 
foreign exchange rates. The sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone caused 
similar impact. Over the last three years, the quick recovery of the Korean 
economy could be highly attributed to its expansionary fiscal and mon- 
etary policies as well as the depreciation of the Korean won. With high 
inflation rates and sovereign debt accumulation, continuing expansionary 
10 See Kim (2009). 
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demand management policies would not be as beneficial to the Korean 
economy. Furthermore, the Global Financial Crisis is expected to continue 
over the next several years. As such, Korea's policies should prioritize 
the implementation of macro-risk management as well as the achieve- 
ment of price, financial, foreign exchange, and fiscal stabilities. Further- 
more, Korea needs pre-emptive actions to resolve the current problems 
and revitalize the economy through job creations in the service sector.
B. Achieving Price Stability
The Korean economy faces several policy difficulties in overcoming the 
recession. As money supply and commodity prices increase, curbing in- 
flation has become a new economic challenge. Price stability is a neces- 
sary condition for maintaining sustainable economic growth and is a major 
government priority, because inflation significantly affects the working 
class.
As of August 2011, the 5.3% inflation rate was higher than the gov- 
ernment target rate of 3%, indicating that the BOK failed to control in- 
flation. Specifically, it maintained call rates at 3.25% for an extended 
period, as the uncertain economic situation intensified with the Euro zone 
sovereign debt crisis. 
If the interest rates continue to be negative for a long time, the bank 
fails not only in controlling inflation but also in addressing household 
debt problems. Recently, household debt has increased faster than the 
nominal GDP. Many people worry about the explosion of household debts 
and insolvency of the financial institution. In principle, interest rates are 
usually increased to reduce inflation rates and household debts. Prior 
to the BOK law revision, the central bank prioritized price stability. Given 
that the revised law additionally requires financial stability, the BOK 
should have raised the interest rates and pursued price stability earlier, 
during the time when the economic situation is positive and no concerns 
abound on the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis.
In fact, the BOK hesitated to raise the interest rates due to concerns 
about the possibility of deterring the economic recovery. A slowing econ- 
omy is feared more than inflation and household debts. However, mon- 
etary authorities should remember that price and financial stability are 
preconditions for long-term, sound economic growth. Understanding the 
reasons for several months of negative interest rates is difficult, consider- 
ing that economic growth rate in the previous year only reached 6.2%. 
The underlying issue is missing the correct timing of policy change, which 
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is the typical time inconsistency problem. Specifically, the bank failed 
to seize the opportunity to raise interest rates, postponing it for several 
months until the expected full economic recovery. However, as the econ- 
omic problems of the U.S. and Euro zone worsened at that precise time, 
the BOK could no longer raise the interest rates. 
C. Achieving Financial Stability
The household debt problem should be addressed to restore financial 
stability. Recently, the household debt burden has increased faster than 
the nominal income growth rates. High debt levels cutting household 
spending contribute to economic recession. Moreover, further escalation 
of the household debt problem can lead to financial instability and trigger 
an economic recession. Therefore, countries around the world naturally 
become apprehensive of financial instability and economic recession as 
household and government debts increase. 
As of June 2011, the outstanding household credit was 876.3 trillion 
won, with household debt accounting for 826 trillion and sales credit 
for 50.3 trillion. Given that a large portion of household debt comes from 
mortgage-related loans, maintaining housing market stability is essential 
to prevent household debt insolvencies. Unlike in advanced economies, 
Korean housing prices have not yet fully adjusted to changing economic 
conditions. A collapse of the real estate market bubbles was one of main 
factors responsible for both Japan's lost decade and the current Global 
Financial Crisis. 
Bernanke, head of the U.S. Federal Reserve, asserted that the cause 
of the real estate market bubble was the U.S. government’s failure to 
supervise and regulate subprime mortgage loans, and not the low inter- 
est rate policy that was persistently maintained after the collapse of the 
IT bubble. Nevertheless, the main cause of the housing market bubble 
was undeniably the loose monetary and credit policy. Collapse of bubbles 
in the housing sector caused the Global Financial Crisis. Thus, to sta- 
bilize the real estate market, we first check whether or not the current 
housing price is overvalued based on the global standard and then im- 
plement measures to prevent possible bubble bursts. If the Korean hous- 
ing market experiences bubble bursts similar to the situation in the 
U.S. or Japan, prices would plummet and lead to mortgage loan insol- 
vencies, consequently triggering an economic downturn. 
The government has prevented mortgage loan insolvencies by imple- 
menting several measures, such as regulations on loan-to-value (LTV) 
        GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND KOREAN ECONOMY 363
and debt to income (DTI) ratios. These measures were proven effective to 
a certain extent. However, Korean mortgage loans have several problems. 
First, its maturity is extremely short. The government encouraged length- 
ening the loan maturity with the introduction of DTI. However, the ma- 
turities of a large portion of mortgage loans are still less than three years. 
Among new loans, 10-year mortgage loans increased by 45% in 2008, 
but 3-year loans still account for nearly 40%.
Another problematic characteristic of Korean mortgage loans is that 
the principal and interest are not evenly paid over the entire borrowing 
period of time. Instead, the loan principle is paid in a lump sum at ma- 
turity. By the end of 2010, 37.3% of mortgage loans became bullet repay- 
ments and 41.3% became repayment by installment. Furthermore, most 
mortgage loans assume floating interest rates, which means that bor- 
rowers are obliged to take on the entire risk caused by interest rates 
fluctuations. The Korean mortgage loan system is highly vulnerable to 
external shocks, and thus, the system has a high possibility of causing 
financial instability when interest rates rise or when the housing market 
is in deep recession. 
Generally, bank LTV ratios are maintained at less than 60%; none- 
theless, saying that a relatively low LTV ratio means mortgage loans are 
safe is an exaggeration. More importantly, LTV ratio is only checked for 
initial banking loans. As a result, loans in the non-banking sector are 
not counted in the LTV calculation. If a housing buyer rents his house 
to another person, demanding a large amount of money deposit (JunSe, 
the typical renting system of Korea), then his real debt position with 
JunSe must be much higher than the LTV. Such mortgage borrowers 
are considerably susceptible to rising interest rates and falling housing 
prices. 
When measures are implemented to cap the expansion of household 
debt, the working class would be highly affected due to reduced acces- 
sibility to banking loans. The low credit and income class would turn to 
the non-banking sector and bear greater risk premiums, resulting in sig- 
nificant damage to their repayment capabilities. Measures on reducing 
household debts should be accompanied by policies to activate financial 
institutions designed for the low credit and income class.
D. Capital Liberalization and Foreign Exchange Rate Stability
Towards the end of 2010, foreign exchange reserves reached US$ 304.5 
billion. Korea is a net creditor country with net assets of US$ 89.5 billion, 
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foreign assets of US$ 487.5 billion, and foreign liability of US$ 398 
billion. However, Korea is highly vulnerable to foreign capital flows. This 
is because Korea’s net international investment is US$ 152 billion, with 
US$ 742.9 billion of overseas investment by Koreans, and US$ 894.9 
billion of domestic investment by foreigners. This peculiarity is because 
foreign stock market investments are not considered as liability of Korea. 
As of end June 2011, with US$ 304.5 billion worth of foreign exchange 
reserves, the ratio of short-term foreign liability to reserve assets and to 
total liability amounted to 49.2% and 37.6%, respectively. 
Foreign exchange rate stability requires measures to control the ex- 
treme fluctuations of foreign capital flows. However, this is difficult be- 
cause such stability is heavily affected by foreign investors who have 
double standards toward advanced and emerging economies in interpre- 
ting imbalances in the balance of payments. Thus, the authorities should 
endeavor to create an environment of advanced economies that welcomes 
foreign investors and ensures a healthy economic situation for them. In 
addition, securing an appropriate level of foreign exchange reserves is 
necessary. With the experience of the Global Financial Crisis, Korea has 
learned that once foreigners pull their money out of the capital market, 
this creates extreme volatility in the foreign exchange and financial market. 
Therefore, sufficient foreign exchange reserves should be prepared, not 
only to cover the foreign liability but also to handle foreign investor move- 
ments in the capital market. In particular, in a small open economy, 
foreign investors often view the size of foreign exchange reserves, the 
size of foreign liability, the ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange 
reserves, and the ratio of current account deficits to GDP as indicators 
of the fundamental soundness of the economy.
E. Achieving Fiscal Stability 
Fiscal soundness is similarly necessary. When fiscal spending expanded 
in the process of overcoming the financial crisis, fiscal soundness nat- 
urally became a major concern. With global economic recession, fiscal 
spending expanded and tax revenues declined in most countries. As the 
debt of the private sector transferred to the public sectors, many coun- 
tries have begun facing sovereign debt risk.11 
The ratio of Korean government debt to GDP is lower than that of most 
OECD countries. However, working towards fiscal balance and evaluating 
11 See Kim (2011).
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the government debt from several different angles is necessary. For 
example, after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the bonds issued by 
the Korea Asset Management Corporation or Korea Deposit Insurance 
Corporation that were not counted as government debt were later con- 
sidered as government debt. Similarly, Monetary Stabilization Bonds 
issued by the BOK and used in open market operations are not counted 
as government debt. In most countries, open market operations are im- 
plemented with government bonds. In addition, public enterprise debts, 
such as those of the Land and Housing Corporation and The Korea Water 
Resources Corporation, rapidly increased during work on national pro- 
jects. If the government is ultimately responsible for these debts, then 
they also have characteristics of government debt. Given these special 
circumstances, government debt (not in the sense of delivering official 
statistics) should be tackled and evaluated from several different angles.
F. Investment and Job Creation
Finally, investment expansion and job creation are urgently needed. As 
export-oriented economies easily encounter limitations for growth, econ- 
omic policy needs to focus on domestic market expansion. In particular, 
conglomerate-led exporting industry encounter limits in generating jobs. 
Thus, increasing investments in the service sector could create jobs. The 
industrial productivity of the service sector among OECD countries ac- 
counts for 90% of the manufacturing sector, yet Korea only records two 
thirds. In the future, the development of service sectors, including health, 
finance, logistics, and education, would definitely lay the foundations for 
job creation and significantly increase the potential for economic growth. 
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